On February 15, 2017, Steve Omohundro spoke to the Million AI Startups group about the opportunities in “AI and Games”:
Next Generation AI Games
Wednesday, Feb 15, 2017, 6:00 PM
Bootup Ventures 68 Willow Road Menlo Park, CA
70 Members Went
The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques in computerized games is as long as the history of AI itself. With recent advancements in AI, new possibilities are emerging for building video games that take entertainment to the next level. In these games every character can exhibit human-like intelligent behavior capable of incrementally learni…
Voting (and other forms of social decision making) are fundamental to our society. Today’s voting machines and technologies are antiquated, inefficient, and insecure. Here’s an excellent 8 minute description by Ron Rivest of how homomorphic encryption could help implement a better system:
Several groups are working to implement this kind of cryptographically secure voting on the blockchain:
In addition to better implementation technology, there are also a number of voting systems which are far superior to the one used in the US. Here’s a nice video describing the problems with “First Past the Post Voting”:
I’ve supported the “Center for Election Science” for years which is trying to institute Approval Voting (originally range voting). This is a simple modification to the current US system with much better properties:
Glen Weyl has uploaded a new version of his paper, QuadraticVoting (written with Steven Lalley), to SSRN, which now includes the completed proofs. Quadraticvoting is the most important idea for law and public policy that has emerged from economics in (at least) the last ten years.
Quadraticvoting is a procedure that a group of people can use to jointly choose a collective good for themselves. Each person can buy votes for or against a proposal by paying into a fund the square of the number of votes that he or she buys. The money is then returned to voters on a per capita basis. Weyl and Lalley prove that the collective decision rapidly approximates efficiency as the number of voters increases. By contrast, no extant votingprocedure is efficient. Majority rule based on one-person-one-votenotoriously results in tyranny of the majority–a large number of people who care only a little about an outcome prevail over a minority that cares passionately, resulting in a reduction of aggregate welfare.
The applications to law and public policy are too numerous to count. In many areas of the law, we rely on highly imperfect votingsystems (corporate governance, bankruptcy) that are inferior to quadraticvoting. In other areas of the law, we require judges or bureaucrats to make valuations while knowing they are not in any position to do so (environmental regulation, eminent domain). Quadraticvoting can be used to supply better valuations that aggregate private information of dispersed multitudes. But the most important setting is democracy itself. An incredibly complicated system of institutional self-checking (separation of powers, federalism) and judicially enforced constitutional rights try to correct for the defects of one-person-one-vote, but do so very badly. Can quadraticvoting do better? Glen and I argue that it can.
Interestingly, it’s been discovered that bees have been using this mechanism for millions of years to choose their next hive location! The energy bees spend on dances grows quadratically in proportion to the attractiveness of the site they saw.